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OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN: THE AMERICAN LEGAL
DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION
“There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other
flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full
freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life…”
President Woodrow Wilson, Annual Address to Congress, December
1915.
“The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third
generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States
citizenship, have become ‘Americanized’ the racial strains are undiluted.”
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Final Report on the Japanese
Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942.
“Citizens and noncitizens, even if equally dangerous, are not similarly
situated.”
Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004.
“My view with regard to profiling noncitizens is different. Noncitizens are
not expected to be loyal to the United States and so the concern with
alienating them by profiling is less acute. No foreigner expects to be treated
identically to a citizen.”
Judge Richard Posner’s blog comments about the considerations that should
be taken into account when deciding whether to engage in racial profiling.

OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN: AN INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the birth of our nation, Congress enacted the Alien
Friends Act, which granted to President John Adams the power to detain
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and deport aliens from any country deemed “dangerous to the country”
without affording them due process of law.1 After the riots and criminal
attacks on prominent public figures that took place subsequent to the end of
World War I, the government ordered various raids directed at deporting
aliens who sympathized with anarchist or communist ideals.2 In the wake of
the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the
internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps with the alleged
purpose of guaranteeing national security.3

As part of a sweeping

government effort to quell terrorism after 9/11, President Bush signed an
executive order allowing special military tribunals to try foreigners
suspected of committing such acts. 4 As a result, the military facilities at
Guantánamo Bay are being primarily used as prisons for the indefinite
detention of non-citizens designated by President Bush as “enemy
combatants.”

1

Officially called An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798)(expired in
1800). The act commonly known as the Alien Enemies Act, adopted at the same time as
the Alien Friends Act, provided that the president could detain and deport aliens of an
enemy nation residing in the United States. See An Act respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1
Stat. 577 (1798)(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §21)..
2

Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation
Hearings, The Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1431 (2003).
3
4

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943).

Elisabeth Bumiller and David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in Terrorist
Cases, N.Y.TIMES, November 14, 2001 at A1.
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All of these governmental acts have one thing in common: they
distinguish between “us” and “them,” “good guys” and “bad guys,”
“friends” and “enemies,” “insiders” and “outsiders.” Near the end of the
18th century, aliens (outsiders) enjoyed less constitutional freedoms than
citizens (insiders). After Pearl Harbor, United States law distinguished
between the Japanese people (them) and the American people (us). Today,
in the post 9/11 world, those associated to so-called “fundamentalist
Islam” (bad guys) are treated differently than those who are supposedly
willing to defend freedom (good guys). In light of these examples, it is hard
to deny that there has always existed, and still exists, an American legal
discourse of exclusion. This discourse of exclusion has been repeatedly
used to legitimate the adoption of measures that target certain groups of
people primarily on the basis of their status as members of a particular
class. Those who have been the focus of these measures have, despite their
presence in the country, experienced what it feels like to be an outsider
looking in.
The existence of this legal discourse of exclusion raises
various important queries. What are the philosophical and historical roots of
the governmental tendency to inequitably target certain groups of people as
a way to safeguard the rest of the populace? Why is it that the State

6
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typically makes use of discourses of exclusion in order to handle emergency
situations, such as the turbulent riots that broke out in the United States
after World War I or the frightening period that resulted after the attacks on
the World Trade Center?

Is it judicious for government to

disproportionately burden certain groups of the population when the
security of the nation is at stake? The purpose of this article is to explore
these fundamental problems. I will do so in four steps.
In Part I, I will examine the political philosophy of various
prominent European and American thinkers in order to explain why
discourses of exclusion seem to lie at the heart of social contract theories of
the State. This might explicate why governments have always been seduced
by the idea that it might be legitimate to safeguard the rights of some (the
non-excluded) at the expense of the rights of others (the excluded).
The next part will be dedicated to briefly recounting several
instances in which the government of the United States has placed unfair
burdens on some groups of people in order to guarantee the safety of the
rest of the population. I will focus on four cases, namely: the curtailing of
the free speech rights of aliens during the Quasi-War of 1798, the
persecution of political dissidents after both world wars, the branding of
Japanese Americans as an “enemy race” that needed to be contained in
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order to avoid another Pearl Harbor, and the recurrent attempt to treat
suspected terrorists differently depending on whether or not they are
American citizens. This historical inquiry will reveal that the United States
government has continuously engaged in the practice of inequitably
burdening certain groups of people during times of actual or perceived
emergency.
In Part III I will attempt to demonstrate that the State cannot
legitimate the use of an official discourse of exclusion by pointing to the
existence of a state of emergency. Even if one accepts that the government
can justifiably impose significant burdens on the population during times of
emergency, it does not follow that it can do so in an inequitable manner.
Besides the fact that enacting measures that target certain groups of people
is constitutionally suspect on various grounds,5 the benefits of making use

5

Measures targeting groups of people on the basis of their political ideals may contravene
the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and association. See U.S. v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). If, on the other hand, the measure allows the government to
search or detain the actor solely because he is a member of particular class, the measure
could violate the Fourth Amendment, since it would allow the seizure or search of the
person on the basis of his status and not on the constitutionally accepted ground of
probable cause or, at the very least, reasonable suspicion.
Measures that purport to punish otherwise non-criminal conduct or to aggravate
the punishment of conduct that is already considered criminal exclusively because the
actor’s status are also problematic. This would contradict the basic tenet that people should
be punished for engaging in wrongful acts, not for being members of a particular class.
This seems to run afoul the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). It should be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court
jurisprudence with regard to the constitutionality of criminalizing conduct in view of the
status of the alleged perpetrator is muddled, to say the least. See, for example, Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). These types of measures could also be void because they
unconstitutionally establish guilt by association alone. See Robel, supra.
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of such measures do not outweigh the costs. The short-term profits seem to
be offset by the fact that trading their liberties for our wellbeing will render
us less safe in the long run. Even though these types of measures might help
prevent attacks against our nation in the near future, they may also
undermine our legitimacy both here and abroad. Ultimately this has the
potential of increasing our vulnerability because it will most likely diminish
cooperation from those who will probably be in a better position to furnish
us with valuable information about possible attacks against our nation.6
Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss the potential perils of attempting to
inequitably target certain groups during times of emergency by examining
and critiquing the recent enactment of a statute7 that authorizes the
construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what its
proponents have suggested, this measure, which asymmetrically requires
Mexicans to assume a burden that is not imposed on our neighbors to the
north, will likely augment the risks of a future terrorist attack, not reduce
them.
I. DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION AND CONTRACTARIANISM

6

DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS : DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
(2003).

THE WAR ON TERRORISM XXII
7

Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367, §1, Oct. 26, 2006, 120 Stat. 2638, codified at
8 U.S.C. 1103.
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Discourses of exclusion find solid grounding in social-contract
theories of the State. This is most evidently the case when the exclusionary
discourse is employed to justify inequitably targeting foreigners in order to
maximize the rights of citizens. There is ample support in the contractarian
literature in favor of depriving aliens of liberties solely because of their
status since, as Professor Gerald Neuman has correctly stated, foreigners,
“by definition, began as outsiders to a particular social contract.”8 Hence,
because of their condition as foreigners, aliens have no natural claim to
sharing the rights that insiders enjoy as ratifiers of the societal pact.
Similarly, the liberal German philosopher Christian Wolff argued
that non-citizens “are bound only to do and not to do the things which must
be done or not done by citizens at the time under the same circumstances,
except in so far as particular laws introduce something else concerning
foreigners”.9 In the same vein, the Swiss legal scholar Emerich de Vattel
argued that aliens only possessed those privileges that the State chose to
give to them, thus making them members of an “inferior order” who,

8

9

Neuman, Gerald L., Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909 (1991).

2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 153 (J. Drake
trans. 1934) (cited in Gerald N. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L. J. 909, 925
(1991) (emphasis added).
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despite having the same obligations towards the government as citizens, had
less rights.10
The tendency to exclude some people from the protection of our
laws based on social contract theories of the state has also influenced the
thinking of various American political scholars. At the turn of the 19th
century, for example, the Federalist lawyer from New England, Harrison
Gray Otis, stated that foreigners lied outside of the scope of the procedural
and substantive safeguards conferred by the Constitution of the United
States because said instrument only protected those who had been parties to
the ratification.11 Likewise, a Federalist committee asserted that since “the
Constitution was made for citizens . . . [aliens] have no rights under it, but
remain in the country and enjoy the benefit of the laws . . . as a matter of
favor and permission.”12 Consequently, the committee concluded that the
rights of aliens may be withdrawn whenever the Government believed that
continuing to afford them with the same rights as citizens would be
“dangerous” to the “general welfare.”13

10

1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
§213 (1758).
11

Neuman, supra, note 9, at 929.

12

Id.

13

Id.
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A contractarian reading of the Constitution has also informed the
opinion of several justices of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in
United States v. Verdugo Urquidez14, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that
non-resident aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because
they are “not part of [our] national community” and have not “otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of
that community.”15

In doing so, he further suggested that non-resident

aliens are also not part of “the people” whose rights to freedom of speech
and association are protected by the First Amendment.16
More recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,17 Justice Scalia argued that
citizens detained as enemy combatants have the right under the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution to challenge the legality of their detention in
federal court, whereas aliens do not.18 He arrived at this conclusion even
though the text of the Suspension Clause remains silent as to whether or not

14

494 U.S. 259 (1990).

15

Id. at 265.
16

If we take Justice Rehnquist’s conclusions seriously, it seems to follow that foreign
journalists temporarily staying in the United States who are neither residents nor citizens
do not have a constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech and press.
17

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

18

Id. at xx.
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aliens are included within the protection afforded by the provision. 19 As
usual, Justice Scalia grounded his position on an originalist reading of the
Constitution. Even though at first glance there seems to be no clear
connection between originalism and contractarianism, it turns out that, upon
closer inspection, contractarianism is linked to most originalist theories of
interpretation. Since social contract theory “seems to have informed our
Nation's founders,”20 any philosophy of constitutional adjudication that
purports to appeal to the meaning of the text at the time of the founding will
be underpinned by contractarian understandings of the obligations that the
State owes to citizens and non-citizens.21
Once it is accepted that social contract theories can serve to
legitimize the practice of discriminating between citizens and aliens, it is
not difficult to imagine how these theories can also lead to justifying the
practice of inequitably targeting a group of people even though they are
citizens. Although citizens have a prima facie right to share whatever
benefits might be afforded to people who are insiders to the compact upon
which societal life was erected, they may lose this right if they can be linked
19

U.S. CONST, art. 1, §9.

20

Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F.Supp. 1245, 1254 n. 7 (E.D.Ark.1995).

21

See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Normative
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Georgetown L. J. 1765, 1774
(1999)(stating that the political theory underlying originalism is “a form of social contract
theory”).
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in some way to those who are not bound by the social-contract.22 This is
particularly the case when the government determines that the societal
group to which the citizens have been linked poses a significant danger to
the rest of the citizenry and to the continued existence of social life
according to the terms of the original pact. Thus, as Professor David Cole
has lucidly argued, it is usually quite easy for the State to “cross the citizennon-citizen divide” and conclude that certain citizens should be inequitably
targeted by the government on the basis of a diagnosis of dangerousness
that stems from their racial (i.e. Japanese internment during WWII) or
political (i.e. McCarthyism) ties to people who are believed to pose a threat
to the rest of the populace.23
Since the political philosophy undergirding the legal discourse of
exclusion is germane to the social contract theory that informed the ideas of
our founding fathers, it should come as no surprise that the United States
government has recurrently made use of the logic that flows from the
contractarian considerations that have been detailed here. Undoubtedly, an
understanding of the theoretical roots of the discourses of exclusion that
give rise to the use of measures that disproportionately burden certain

People may not be bound by the terms of the social-contract either because they were
never parties to the compact or because they have decided to live outside of its terms.
22

23

COLE, supra note 6, at 85-87.
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groups of people helps us to explain why our political institutions have
repeatedly yielded to this exclusionary logic. It does not, however, provide
us with a completely adequate account of why the use of such measures has
been so seductive during times of perceived emergency. Such an account
can only be afforded upon an examination of the historical instances in
which our government has opted to target certain groups as a way to protect
the rest of the populace. This is precisely the purpose of Part II of the
article.
II. OUTSIDERS V. INSIDERS - THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH LEGAL
DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION
A. FOREIGNERS (AND THEIR FRIENDS) AS OUTSIDERS
1. FRENCH ALIENS AS OUTSIDERS - THE QUASI WAR OF 1798 AND THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
The first time that the United States officially toyed with a discourse
of exclusion on the basis of non-racist motivations was in 1798.24
Francophobia infiltrated the hearts and minds of Americans soon after
diplomatic relations with three French intermediaries turned sour during the
spring of 1798. The public was irate after learning that the French agents

24

It should go without saying that our government employed a legal discourse of exclusion
against black slaves from the time of our founding until well into the 20th century. This
discourse of exclusion was grounded on racism and prejudice. The focus of this article,
however, is documenting and critiquing the American government’s attempt to justify the
use of such discourses by appealing to seemingly neutral and non-racist arguments. Thus, I
will focus on examining governmental measures that inequitably target certain social
groups on the basis of allegedly non-prejudiced grounds.

Outsiders Looking In
had demanded a substantial loan from the U.S. government,

15
a formal

apology from President John Adams and a bribe before they would engage
in peace negotiations with the United States. This breakdown in diplomacy
between the two countries, which came to be known as the XYZ affair,
fueled anti-French sentiment in America and gave the faltering presidency
of John Adams a much needed boost.25
After the Federalist Congress was informed of the XYZ
affair in April 1798, a military showdown with the French seemed
inevitable.

Even though there was never a formal declaration of war,

hostilities between both countries began in 1798 and lasted until 1800. This
conflict, which was fought almost entirely at sea, is referred to as the QuasiWar of 1798. 26 In the wake of the Quasi-War, Congress enacted the Alien
Friends and Sedition Acts with the alleged purpose of protecting Americans
from attacks from aliens of “enemy powers” (i.e. French aliens). These
Acts were manifestly designed to discriminate against French aliens and
their sympathizers solely on the basis of their status as members of an
enemy race that was considered to be dangerous to the peace and security of
the United States. While the Alien Friends Act proved to be a useful tool to
25 JAMES

F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND
THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 41 (2002).
26

See Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American
Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1 (Fall 1999).
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silence French aliens who were critical of the administration, the passage of
the Sedition Act provided the government with an equally powerful
mechanism for suppressing American critics.27

The Sedition Act was

primarily directed toward destroying Jeffersonian Republican opposition to
the Federalist Party.28 Various well-known Jeffersonians, mostly journalists
and editors, were indicted for violating its provisions.29
History has not been kind to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
President Jefferson, whose Republican Party ousted the Federalists from
power in the election of 1800, believed that the laws were unconstitutional
and did not renew the Alien Friends Act after it expired in 1800. The
Sedition Act was also allowed to expire.30 Most scholars have since agreed
with Jefferson’s assessment of the acts. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
stated in dicta that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this
Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of
history”.31
The enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts marked the
27

James Morton Smith, The Enforcement of the Alien Friends Act of 1798, The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 at 85 (June 1954).
28

Simon, supra note 25 at 51.

29

See id. at 52-55 for a sampling of those indicted.

30 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE

(1991).
31

NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).

Outsiders Looking In

17

beginning of a sorry chapter in American law and politics in which specific
groups of people have been forced into the status of outsiders looking in.
By branding French aliens and their American sympathizers as members of
an enemy class whose civil liberties could be curtailed in order to protect
the peace and security of the rest of the populace, the government paved the
way for the enactment of future statutes that legitimized measures that
inequitably target certain people in the name of national security. It should
thus come as no surprise that with the advent of World War I, the United
States again resorted to a discourse of exclusion in an attempt to protect the
country from internal and external threats.
2. RUSSIAN ALIENS AS OUTSIDERS – THE PALMER RAIDS
Less than a year after the cessation of World War I hostilities,
an elaborate scheme to mail 36 bombs to well-known statesmen and
politicians was exposed. The targets included Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, entrepreneurs J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, and
the Attorney General at the time, A. Mitchell Palmer.32 In June of 1919,
nine bombs were detonated in eight different American cities, including one
in Palmer’s Washington, D.C. home. 33 The attacks came at a time in which
the American people were becoming increasingly suspicious of anyone who
32

Cohen, supra note 2, n. 104.

33

Id. at n. 108. See also COLE, supra note 6, at 118.
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advocated anarchist or communist ideals, particularly foreigners. 34
Governmental reaction to the events was swift. Less than six
months after the bomb scares, Attorney General Palmer and the chief of the
Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, ordered law
enforcement authorities to engage in a series of raids against members of
the alleged radical groups who were thought to be behind the attacks. The
raids were undertaken without regard to traditional principles of
constitutional law.

The venerable Fourth Amendment requirement that

there be probable cause before governmental authorities engage in a search
was blatantly ignored. Instead, the chief criterion for determining whether
someone ought to be arrested or searched was if he was a member of certain
groups, including the Union of Russian Workers, the Communist Party, and
the Communist Labor Party.”35
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the people targeted
during the Palmer Raids were foreigners, especially Russians and Eastern
Europeans.36 The raids took place during a time in which many Americans
believed that a Bolshevik revolution in the United States was unavoidable.
34

See Cohen, supra note 2, at 1454-55.

35

Id. at 1458.
36

Law enforcement officials were instructed that “[o]nly aliens should be arrested; if
American citizens are taken by mistake, their cases should be immediately referred to the
local authorities.” Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F.17 18 Ohio Law Rep. 241, 37 n.2 (D.
Mass. 1920), rev’d sub nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F.129 (1st Cir. 1922)
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As a result of the widespread hysteria that accompanied the predictions of a
communist coup in our country, it seemed natural at the time to focus the
nation’s investigative efforts on Russian aliens and their sympathizers.
Thus, equipped with the tools provided by the Alien Control Act of 1918,37
thousands of Russian non-citizens were arrested on the basis of their
suspected ties with radical anarchist or communist groups. In fact, many
people were arrested simply because their names appeared on the
membership lists of local Russian or Communist Clubs.38 In a patent denial
of due process, the Immigration Bureau rules regarding aliens’ access to
counsel at the subsequent deportation hearings were amended to deny the
aliens this right as well as the right to examine the evidence to be used
against them until the inspector decided that “the hearing had proceeded
sufficiently in the development of the facts to protect the government’s
interests.”39
As with the targeting of French aliens during the Quasi-War
of 1798, governmental authorities in the post World War I period resorted to
imposing unfair burdens on certain groups of people in an attempt to secure

37 Act

of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (repealed June, 1952).

38

This was done without regard to how the names came to be on the lists. In some cases,
the arrested non-citizens legitimately had no idea they were “members” of the Communist
party. See, COLE supra note 6, at 119-21.
39

Colyer, 265 F.17 at 46.
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the nation during a time of perceived emergency. Up to this point, however,
only the liberties of non-citizens (French aliens and Russian aliens) were
being eroded in an effort to protect the country. Things would change when
less than twenty years later the government decided that it could no longer
ensure security by targeting only foreigners.

A special committee of

Congress had started investigating “unpatriotic” activities and American
citizens would no longer be safe from investigation solely on the basis of
their status as members of a particular class.
B. AMERICANS AS OUTSIDERS
1. POLITICAL DISSIDENTS AS OUTSIDERS - ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE
SECOND RED SCARE
Things settled down for a while after the Palmer Raids.
American authorities had arrested nearly ten thousand Russian aliens
suspected of having radical ties and sent a couple of hundred back to the
Soviet Union in “Soviet Arks.”40 With the fears of a Bolshevik revolution
on United States soil dissipating, most Americans were content to sit back
and enjoy the Roaring Twenties. Before long, however, we were focused on
a new enemy. With the events leading up to World War II unfolding in rapid
succession, concern over Nazi Germany emerged and feelings of unease
about communist Russia resurfaced. Fearing that some of the pernicious
40

Cohen, supra note 2, at 1460.
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ideals underlying these political movements had started to contaminate
people on this side of the Atlantic, the House of Representatives, with
Congressmen Martin Dies, Jr. and Samuel Dickstein in the lead, created the
Special Committee on Un-American Activities (later HUAC) in 1938 to
investigate unpatriotic behavior.41
Perhaps because of America’s marriage of convenience with
Russia during the Second World War, the HUAC’s monitoring activities
were relatively minor in comparison to what was to take place after the
defeat of the Axis alliance in 1945. Fueled by Churchill’s famous warning
about the descent of an iron curtain through Europe,42 the Republican Party,
which had soundly trounced the Democrats in the elections of 1946,43
revamped the HUAC and embarked on an unprecedented effort to detect
homegrown threats.
Since the numerous acts of the HUAC are well documented, there is
no need to detail them here.44 A couple of them are worth mentioning,

41

William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375, 398-99.
42

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
the Continent.”, Winston Churchill, Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, MO (Mar. 5,
1946).
43

The Republican campaign capitalized on the growing fear of Communist expansion in
America.
44

See WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER
HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, (1968).

OF OTHE
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though. In 1947, for example, the committee grew increasingly suspicious
about the existence of a Soviet spy network in Hollywood. This prompted it
to launch an investigation with the purpose of determining whether various
members of the Hollywood community identified themselves as
communists. The probe was so far-reaching that not even ten year old child
star Shirley Temple was spared from questioning by the Committee.45
As a result of this investigation, ten Hollywood screenwriters were
sentenced to between six and twelve months in prison for refusing to
answer the Committee’s questions about their political affiliations and
alleged ties with the Communist Party.46 The “Hollywood Ten,” as they
would come to be called, claimed that they possessed a First Amendment
right decline to respond to the questions because requiring them to do so
would compromise their freedom of association. 47
The governmental targeting of people who were suspected of
holding communist views reached its zenith when in 1950 a Democratically
led Congress overrode President Truman’s veto to pass the Internal Security

45

Steven J. Bucklin, To Preserve These Rights: The Constitution and National
Emergencies, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 85, 90 (2002).
46

Kalah Auchincloss, Congressional Investigations and the Role of Privilege, 43 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 165, 176 (Winter 2006).
47

Id.

Outsiders Looking In
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The ISA required, among other things, that Communist

organizations register with the Attorney General. It also called for the
creation of the “Subversive Activities Control Board” (SACB) which was to
be in charge of overseeing the registration procedure. Any alien who was
found to be a member of an organization investigated by the SACB was not
allowed to become a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, any naturalized citizen
could be denaturalized in five years on the basis of their membership in any
of the targeted groups.49
In view of the sweeping scope of the ISA, its
constitutionality was challenged on various occasions on First Amendment
grounds. Even though the Supreme Court initially upheld the validity of the
law, 50 it ultimately struck down most of its provisions in several well-known
cases.51 The Court put the last nail on the ISA’s coffin in United States v.
Robel52 , where it concluded that the ISA statute unconstitutionally
“establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an
individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government in
48

Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§781-858.
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Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amentdment: The Shaping of Freedom of
Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1991).
50

Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);. Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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proscribing it.”53
Despite the fact that most provisions of the ISA were
eventually declared unconstitutional, the measures adopted by the
government during the first decades of the Cold War represented a
disturbing change in American policy. Whereas the laws enacted in the
name of national security during the Quasi War and before and after World
War I were specifically tailored to disaffect aliens, the anti-communist
statutes enacted after the Second World War were designed to marginalize
citizens on the basis of their affiliation with certain groups.

Some

Americans finally had a taste of how it felt to be an outsider looking in.
2. RACIAL GROUPS AS OUTSIDERS– THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT CAMPS
Americans linked to communist organizations were not the
only ones who received short shrift as a result of the concerns over national
security that emerged during World War II. Americans of Japanese ancestry
fared much worse.

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued

Executive Order 906654 , which authorized the military to prescribe areas
“from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which,
the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to
whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military
53

Id. at 265.

54

Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
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Commander may impose in his discretion.”55
As it turned out, the Armed Forces ended up designating the entire
West Coast as a military area from which those with enemy race lineage
(i.e. Japanese Americans) could be excluded. What followed was one of the
most disgraceful episodes in the history of the United States. In less than a
year, military authorities had forcefully displaced well over 100,000
Japanese people and relocated them to several internment camps located in
various states. Nearly two-thirds of the internees were American citizens.56
To add insult to injury, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Executive Order 9066 in the now infamous decision of Korematsu v. United
States57 on the grounds that the establishment of the internment camps was
justified in virtue of military necessity.58
Korematsu is now considered to be one of the worst opinions
ever handed down by the Supreme Court. One would believe that after
apologizing to the survivors of the internment and awarding a Presidential
Medal of Honor to the plaintiff in the Korematsu case, the government had
come to the conclusion that adopting measures that inequitably target
55

Id.

56

Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 Michigan L. Rev.
1595, 1618 (2005).
57

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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certain groups of people during times of emergency was unwise.
Nevertheless, in 2004 Fred Korematsu found himself filing an amicus
curiae brief in the case of Rasul v. Bush 59 opposing the government’s claim
that it could indefinitely detain enemy combatants in Guantánamo Bay
without allowing them to challenge the legality of their detention. Much to
Fred Korematsu’s surprise, the government was again employing the type of
measures that led to his detention in the name of national security.

C. ALIENS (MOSTLY MUSLIM) AS OUTSIDERS – GUANTÁNAMO BAY AND
THE WAR ON TERROR
September 11, 2001 changed the way Americans look at the
world. Airplanes and subways don’t seem to be as safe as we once thought
they were. We are now willing to tolerate increased security measures at
airports and train stations in order to minimize the possibility of being the
victim of another attack. The attacks on the Twin Towers also changed the
way that the government looks at things. New tools are thought to be
needed in order to wage the war on terrorism. One of the government’s
weapons of choice in this new war is instituting programs that curtail the
rights of aliens in an effort to gain intelligence that might prove to be crucial
to stopping the next attack.
59

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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Guantánamo for the indefinite detention of enemy aliens constitutes the
most poignant example of such efforts.
During the last few years, the Executive Branch has
vehemently argued that Guantánamo detainees have no access to federal
courts by claiming that foreigners detained as enemy combatants do not
have a right to petition for habeas corpus, even though equally dangerous
citizens detained in the same manner presumably do. Fundamental to this
claim is the government’s contention that aliens are not part of “the people”
protected by the Constitution of the United States. As a result of this
contractarian view of the bill of rights, on September 28, 2006, Congress
passed the Military Commissions Act60 , which, among other things,
declares that no state or federal court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a
habeas corpus petition filed by non-citizens designated by the President as
“enemy combatants.”
As we can see, history has a tendency to repeat itself. More
than two hundred years ago, the American government unfairly targeted
French aliens with the alleged purpose of guaranteeing the security of the
rest of the populace. Today we are targeting Muslim aliens in much the
same manner for what essentially seem to be the same reasons.

60

Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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D. AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION –
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
This brief historical recount reveals that government has typically

targeted groups of people in an inequitable manner as a way of attempting
to neutralize what at the time appeared to be significant threats to the social
order. It is difficult to explain why the government has repeatedly decided
to act in this way when it is perceived that our national security is
threatened. While racism61 and xenophobia62 can partially account for some
of the measures that have been discussed here, there seems to be an even
more fundamental explanation for these events. Governmental authorities
appear to believe that engaging in these types of acts during times of crisis
can somehow make us safer. If this is the case, various queries require our
attention. The most fundamental of these is determining whether it is true
that engaging in such practices actually maximizes our security. It is to this
question that I now turn.
III. THE PERILS OF UNFAIRLY TARGETING SOME GROUPS OF PEOPLE IN
ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE REST OF THE POPULACE
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

61 Against
62 Against

the Japansese during WWII, for example.

French aliens during the Quasi War of 1798 and against Russian aliens during
the period after WWI, for example. Xenophobia may also partially explain the measures
recently taken against Muslims in the post 9/11 era.
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Given that government tends to gravitate towards the inequitable
targeting of allegedly dangerous groups of people during times of crisis, it
seems logical to ask whether doing so really helps us to successfully secure
our nation. In this section it will be argued that, contrary to what has
traditionally been contended by our government, engaging in these
discriminatory practices is misguided because the benefits of making use of
such practices have not been proven to outweigh the costs of implementing
them. For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the objective
of targeting some people in order to protect the rights of many is to secure
the continued existence of the State by preventing extremely harmful
attacks from being carried out and not to further racist agendas.63
Furthermore, I will avoid delving into the constitutional questions
that engaging in such acts raises because those who have advocated its use
clearly believe that there is a law of necessity that trumps the provisions of
the Constitution that might be nominally infringed during times of national

63 Unfortunately, this assumption is not entirely supported by the past practices of our
nation. It seems quite clear, for example, that the creation of the Japanese internment camps
was motivated by racial prejudice.
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emergency. 64 Thus, in an effort to engage in a fruitful exchange with those
who believe that employing the insider/outsider distinction is sometimes an
indispensable tool in the fight to secure our nation in moments of crisis, I
will steer clear of deontological arguments based on the inviolability of
certain constitutional rights and will focus on advancing consequentialist
arguments that show that unfairly burdening some groups of people as a
mechanism for maximizing the security of those not burdened by the
measures is unwise.
B. THE REINFORCED BELIEFS ARGUMENT
One of the major drawbacks of excluding some groups from having
access to the full protection of our laws as a way to protect the security of
the rest of the population is that the strategy can backfire because of what I
call the “reinforced beliefs argument.” In the context of terrorism, the
argument can be summed up in the following manner:
(1) Terrorists firmly believe that the people they are attacking
deserve to be harmed because they are members of a State (or
64

The position that the law of necessity might require that the government disobey the
Constitution has been defended by numerous well-known scholars. The most recent
defense of this view was advanced by Judge Richard Posner in his NOT A SUICIDE PACT:
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people) that they consider to be acting immorally or
unjustifiably.
(2) When the country that is threatened by the possibility of an
attack resorts to measures that inequitably target certain groups
of people it reinforces the terrorists’ beliefs that the country they
purport to attack acts in an immoral manner.
(3) Thus, requiring that a particular group of people carry a greater
burden than the rest of the populace might lead to an increase of
attacks because it strengthens the convictions of terrorists’
regarding the immorality of the State that they purport to attack.
The recent American experience with terrorism lends credence to the
validity of the first premise of the reinforced beliefs argument.

It is

common knowledge that Al-Qaeda “motivate[s] their members through
claims that the West has socially, economically and politically humiliated
Islamic society.”65 This leads members of the organization to believe that
killing innocent civilians in these western countries, particularly the United
States, is morally justified because these innocent civilians are in some way
associated with the allegedly humiliating acts that their country has

65

Assertion made by Brad O’Neill, Director of Insurgency Studies at the National War
College in Washington in an interview entitled “What Motivated a Terrorist”, appearing in
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/TerroristMotives2006-04-13voa52.cfm?CFID=104014423&CFTOKEN=17679335.
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performed. It also seems to be true that this belief is usually the product of
deeply held political and/or religious convictions that are not easily
manipulated or changed.
As a result of this, it seems fair to conclude, as is posited in the
second premise of the argument, that targeting foreigners (especially
Muslim aliens) by restricting their liberties more than the rest of the
population will reinforce Al-Qaeda’s claim that the United States debases
Islamic communities. The treatment of the predominantly Muslim aliens
detained in Guantánamo Bay presents a case in point.

The evidently

discriminatory treatment of these detainees only seems to confirm our
enemy’s claim that we humiliate foreigners, especially Muslims. This, in
turn, validates their beliefs about the immorality of our country.66
If it is true that inequitably targeting certain groups can lead to a
corroboration of the claims of immorality put forth by our enemies, then
making use of such measures as a way to combat terrorism might be
counterproductive in two ways. First, it might lead to engendering more
resolute terrorists who have found in America’s use of exclusionary
measures an additional reason for attacking the country. Second, it might
66

Charles H.Anderton & John R. Carter, Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to
Terrorism, pp. 10-11 (August 30, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=595242 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.595242. (stating that “prisoner abuse scandal[s] can
be seen as a form of “negative advertising” that may have reshaped terrorist preferences
toward more terrorism”)
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provide some individuals who previously had no intention of attacking our
country with new reasons to believe that the use of force against our nation
is morally justifiable.67
C. THE SUBSTITUTION ARGUMENT
Adopting measures that target some groups of people to the
exclusion of others presents a further problem which can be illustrated by
what I call the “substitution argument”.

In a nutshell, the substitution

argument holds that restricting the liberties of some during times of national
emergency does not make us safer because those intent on harming us will
readily adapt by looking for people in the non-excluded groups who will
help them carry out their plans. The effect of this is that members of the
targeted class will be substituted by people who are not being targeted in an
attempt to circumvent the precautionary measures undertaken by the
country.
The Israeli experience with terrorism lends support to the
aforementioned argument. Take, for example, the notorious case of Kozo
Okamoto.68 Okamoto orchestrated a terrorist attack that took place on May
67

Jayne Docherty, What Motivates the Terrorist or Potential Terrorist?, in http://
www.emu.edu/ctp/bse-motivates.html (stating that “The moderation and nonviolence of the
sympathizers can change, particularly if the claims listed above are validated by events in
the international arena.
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830-845 (1976).

34

Outsiders Looking In

30, 1972, at Israel’s Lod Airport in Tel Aviv. After getting off Air France’s
Flight 132 to Tel-Aviv, Okamoto and his accomplices proceeded to the
baggage claim area where they took machine guns and hand grenades from
their suitcases and opened fire on the people in the terminal. After all was
said and done, Okamoto had killed twenty-six innocent civilians, mostly
Puerto Rican Christians on their way back from a pilgrimage to sacred sites
in Israel. It turned out that Okamoto, who was a member of the Japanese
Red Army, was sponsored by the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP obviously decided to sponsor Okamoto and
his Japanese co-conspirators in an attempt to avoid raising suspicions about
the impending attack. The strategy worked, for Okamoto and his gang
attracted little attention before the terrorist acts took place.
The Okamoto case exemplifies a paradigmatic instance of
substitution, in which the terrorist PFLP successfully managed to take
advantage of the fact that Israeli authorities were focusing their
counterterrorism efforts on identifying potentially dangerous Middle
Eastern men by encouraging people from a different race than the one being
targeted by the authorities to engage in acts of terrorism.
The recent rise of terrorist acts perpetrated by women represents
another example of how organizations adopt substitution techniques as a
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way of frustrating governmental attempts to secure their nation by
disproportionately burdening people from a particular demographic group.
In 2002, for example, the world was surprised when it was confirmed that
close to 20 women took part in the taking of 700 hostages in a Moscow
theater. That same year, the first female suicide bombers appeared in Israel.
The increase in attacks carried out by women is, at least in part, the product
of the conscious decision of terrorist organizations to recruit people who are
not being targeted by the government in an attempt to sidestep preventive
security measures. Hence, as it has been pointed out:
After the attacks of Sept. 11, the security measures introduced at
airports, train stations and other public places were geared toward
the perpetrators of the hijackings. As all the members of the group
around Mohammed Atta were young, male and of Middle Eastern
origin (as well as appearance), it was little surprise that this became
the prototype at which law enforcement agencies around the world
were looking most closely. Terror networks like Al Qaeda were
quick to spot this vulnerability, and consequently set out to recruit
operatives who did not fit the standard description.69
The conscious effort made by terrorist networks to employ
techniques of substitution as a way to exploit the vulnerabilities of security
measures that rely heavily on the targeting of a particular group of people as
presumptively

dangerous

individuals

demonstrates

the

potentially

catastrophic shortcomings of such measures. Consequently, as a result of
69 Alexis

Delaney & Peter Neumann, Another Failure in Imagination? The Spectacular Rise
of the Female Terrorist, International Herald Tribune, September 4, 2004, http://
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substitution techniques, disproportionately targeting certain demographic
groups might make us less safe in the long run.
C. THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT
Disproportionately targeting certain groups of the population during
a time of crisis is also problematic because of what I call the “legitimacy
argument.”

The following example illustrates the considerations

underpinning the argument. Those who have recently taken the New York
City subway have probably seen an ad posted in some subway cars by the
city’s Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) that features photographs of a
dozen sets of eyes with the headline “There are 16 million eyes in the city.
We’re counting on all of them.”70 According to the MTA, the purpose of
the ad is to “remind customers of the need to stay aware of their
surroundings and to report anything suspicious.”71 Evidently, the point of
the message is to stress the fact that cooperation of the city’s residents and
visitors with local authorities is vital to ensuring security.
It should be noted, however, that such cooperation can only be
expected if the people believe that the government is acting in a legitimate
manner. Thus, if local law enforcement authorities are perceived to be
acting illegitimately, the prospects for cooperation from subway riders
70

http://www.mta.info/mta/news/newsroom/eyesecurity.htm

71
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diminish. As Professor Strauss has stated, “the characteristic feature of a
claim of illegitimacy is the assertion that, as a moral matter, full obedience
[to a governmental act] is not required”.72 Thus, obedience to authorities
and cooperation with the government decreases as the perceived legitimacy
of law enforcement agencies diminishes.
Once one accepts that an increase in the perceived illegitimacy of a
government augments the probability that the people will not obey
authorities, it is easy to see why adopting measures that inequitably burden
some groups of people will probably reduce cooperation of the populace
with the State.

Selectively targeting a group of people will almost

inevitably alienate a substantial portion of the targeted population. This
makes us less safe because it diminishes the probability that members of the
alienated group will cooperate with the police and other law enforcement
agencies in their attempts to prevent attacks.

The following example

provided by Professors Tyler and Fagan explains this phenomenon:
Thinking that one has been stopped by the police because of one’s
ethnicity reflects the belief that one has been profiled. This
judgment has negative consequences during personal encounters
with the police, because it encourages resistance and antagonism, as
well as undermining the legitimacy of the police. On the
community level, if members of the community believe that
profiling is widespread, they are less supportive of the police. These

72

David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 Harvard L. Rev. 1854, 1861 (2005).
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profiling effects emerge because people view profiling as an unfair
policing procedure.73
The pernicious effects of unfairly targeting some social groups as a

mechanism for maximizing our security are exacerbated by the fact that the
people whose cooperation authorities typically need the most are precisely
those who are being targeted. If it is true that those who are being targeted
constitute a particularly dangerous group of people, then it should follow
that the government should not want to alienate those who are in a
particularly privileged position to observe suspicious activity that, if
communicated to the police in a timely fashion, might lead to the prevention
of attacks on the community.
The abovementioned problem is compounded when one considers
that cooperation from other countries, especially Middle Eastern states,
which is also essential to our efforts to minimize the occurrence of terrorist
attacks in our country, is probably lessened when we make use of the
measures that are being critiqued here. The reason for this is that unfairly
targeting certain portions of the population breeds anti-American sentiment
across the globe, particularly in the countries of origin of those who are
targeted the most.

73

Tom Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
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In short, adopting measures during times of crisis that unfairly
burden a particular group of people emasculates our legitimacy both
domestically and internationally. This will in all probability hinder our
efforts to secure our nation because it will undercut local and foreign
cooperation with our government.
E. THE PRESUMPTION ARGUMENT
I have chosen to dub the last argument that I will advance against
the practice of unfairly targeting certain groups of people during times of
emergency “the presumption argument.” It can be summarized in the
following manner:
(1) Since acts that inequitably burden some groups of people have
unquestionable adverse effects on the targeted group, engaging in such acts
is presumptively wrong.
(2) Government can justifiably engage in presumptively wrongful
conduct if it can demonstrate that the adverse effects of performing the act
are offset by the benefits it generates.
(3) An answer to the question about whether the benefits of targeting
certain groups of people during times of crisis outweigh the costs is elusive
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because there is currently no way of meaningfully assigning probabilities to
the possible beneficial effects of engaging in such a practice.74
(4) Thus, the government cannot justify the practice because it has
no way of proving that doing so will have a beneficial effect, whereas there
is little doubt that doing so will adversely affect the members of the group
being targeted.
The first premise of the argument creates a presumption against
adopting measures that inequitably target members of a particular group of
people in light of its manifestly adverse effects. Since the negative effects
of such acts are well documented, there is no need to go over them in detail
here. It suffices to say that engaging in these types of acts surely has the
following detrimental effects: (1) it contributes to the stigmatization of the
group being targeted;75 (2) it generates feelings of resentment on the part of
the targeted people; and (3) it restricts the rights or benefits of the members
of the targeted group. It thus seems sensible to conclude that, in light of the
aforementioned considerations, the costs of engaging in these acts are not
small or negligible. This should lead us to deem such acts as prima facie or
presumptively wrongful.
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With regard to the second premise, it seems to be obvious that the
State should be able to inequitably target certain groups of people only if it
can show that doing so is in the best interests of society as a whole. This
dovetails with the case law that requires courts to inquire whether a
governmental act that discriminates on the basis of race or another of the socalled suspect classifications is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest. In such cases, the courts are called to balance the negative
consequences of discrimination against the positive aspects that the act
seeks to produce. If the adverse effects of the conduct are thought to
outweigh its potential benefits, the governmental act will be invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause.76

The contention defended here is

similar. As a result of the non-negligible costs of engaging in acts that
inequitably target certain groups of people, the State should be required to
satisfactorily prove that performing such acts “meets other social goals in a
way [that can] overcome [the adverse effects of the act].”77
The third premise is grounded on the fact that deciding if the
targeting of certain social groups will contribute to achieving a socially
desirable outcome is impracticable because there does not currently seem to
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constitutes a
good example of a case in which the Supreme Court had to decide whether the positive
effects of a discriminatory act outweighed its adverse consequences.
76

77

Durlauf, supra, note 74, pp. 6.
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be a way of adequately quantifying the benefits that such a policy might
engender. It is not altogether clear, for example, whether the en masse
preventive detention of non-citizens carried out by the United States
government in the wake of 9/11 has led to any tangible benefits. Since the
attacks on the World Trade Center, more than 5,000 aliens have been
preventively detained. As of the moment that this article was written, none
of those detentions has culminated in the conviction of a person for
engaging in a terrorist act.78

This, of course, does not mean that the

detentions have not yielded any benefits. As we all know, it is usually very
difficult to prove a negative. It cannot be ruled out that the preventive
detention of aliens after 9/11 has spawned non-trivial benefits despite the 0
for 5000 statistic. However, statistics such as these do appear to highlight
the fact that it is very difficult to express in objective terms whether such
conduct actually produces positive consequences. Contrarily, quantifiable
information tending to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of these strategies
abounds. Besides the abovementioned statistic, one could point out that the
federal government’s “Special Registration Program,” which targeted men
from Muslim and Arab countries by requiring them to be fingerprinted,

78
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photographed and interviewed, has failed to produce a single charge of
terrorism related activity even though over 80,000 people were targeted.79
If we couple these figures with the reinforced beliefs, substitution
and legitimacy arguments discussed in the previous subsections, the benefits
of targeting certain groups, whether it is because they are aliens (preventive
detention statistic) or because they are part of a particular ethnic group
(Special Registration program statistic), are, at the very least, unclear.
Consequently, it is fair to state that it cannot be objectively concluded that
the benefits of employing such measures outweigh the costs, for although
the drawbacks of engaging in such a tactic seem evident, the benefits of
doing so do not.
Once we accept the abovementioned premises, the conclusion set
forth in (4) should naturally follow. If unfairly targeting certain groups of
people is presumptively wrong and the government cannot demonstrate in a
meaningful manner that engaging in such an act furthers some other societal
goal, the conduct should not be allowed. Since the government should only
be permitted to perform prima facie wrongful acts when it can afford

79
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reasons that justify the conduct all things being considered, the failure to
provide such reasons should lead to a rejection of the practice.80
V. THE SECURITY FENCE ACT OF 2006 – A CASE STUDY ON THE PERILS
OF THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION
The best way to illustrate the arguments advanced in Part IV against
the judiciousness of adopting measures that inequitably target certain
groups during times of crisis is by way of a recent example. Less than a
year ago, Congress enacted the Security Fence Act of 2006 (SFA), which
authorizes the construction of a 700 mile wall along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Many lawmakers seem to believe that erecting such a structure will,
among other things, minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack because, as
U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) has stated, “fences would be a
hindrance to terrorists should they decide to come across a land border
between the U.S. and Mexico and to California.”81 The SFA has alienated
Mexicans and Latinos both here and abroad, who wonder why the
government had specifically chosen to target their border even though the
border with Canada is three times longer than the one with Mexico.

80
81

Durlauf, supra note 74, p. 6.

John Hawkin’s telephone interview with Congressman Duncan Hunter. An edited
transcript of the interview can be found in http://rightwingnews.com/interviews/
duncanhunter.php.
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The absence of a fence with our friends to the north will likely cause
our potential attackers to adapt by attempting to enter our country through
Canada instead of Mexico.

This constitutes a classic example of

substitution techniques that might be used by terrorists as a way to get
around measures like the SFA. The foolishness of believing that the SFA
will lead to a reduction in terrorism is further highlighted by the fact that
none of the people who have attempted to commit acts of terrorism in the
United States have come through Mexico, whereas at least one entered the
country through the Canadian border. 82
Construction of the wall could also end up hurting our national
security initiatives, for it will likely lead to a deterioration of U.S-Mexico
relations during a time when close collaboration between both countries is
critical to waging the war against terror. This fear has been corroborated by
the concerns voiced by the two most recent Mexican presidents who have
denounced the idea of building a wall to separate the two countries as
“shameful,”83 “deplorable,”84 and as a mistake akin to the building of the
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Berlin wall.85 Breeding such feelings of resentment amongst the Mexican
people could undercut our efforts to secure the nation, since it will likely
diminish the perceived legitimacy of American strategies to fight terrorism.
If this were to happen, one should expect cooperation of Mexicans and
Hispanics with our government to decrease as well. Given that Latinos
account for over 15% of the population of the United States, it does not
seem like a good idea to enact measures that tend to alienate them. This is
especially the case when the benefits of adopting such measures remain
unclear.
Since the SFA has both the likelihood of increasing the use of
substitution techniques that might encourage potential terrorists to enter the
country by crossing the Canadian border and the potential for reducing
Hispanic cooperation with law enforcement authorities, it could very well
be the case that the law might actually make us less safe. Such is the
paradoxical nature of governmental acts that inequitably burden a particular
group of people with the alleged purpose of promoting the security of the
rest of the population. They tend to achieve exactly the opposite of what
was intended by those that promoted their adoption.
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CONCLUSION
During the last two hundred years, our government has frequently
enacted measures that unfairly burden certain social groups during times of
crisis. The historical analysis set forth in Part II of this article reveals that
adoption of such measures is usually justified by an appeal to national
security. Thus, we have been told that we need to exclude some groups
from the full protection of our laws in order to guarantee the safety of the
rest of the populace.
I believe that this is a false dichotomy. There is no need to
debate whether we should inequitably target certain groups of people as a
way to maximize our security because there is no hard evidence tending to
prove that doing so will really make us safer. Moreover, it seems that in
light of the reinforced beliefs, legitimacy, substitution and presumption
arguments advanced in Part IV, there is reason to believe that adopting such
laws will make us less secure in the long run.

